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FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATE LAW PRINCIPLES OF STRICT
LIABILITY IN A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT-A PREEMPTION PROBLEM IN

ACT?-Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979)
LIGHT OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON

INTRODUCTION

In the event of a major nuclear accident, Congress has imposed a
form of strict liability on the nuclear industry through the PriceAnderson Act.' The Act provides for a waiver of state and common
law defenses' in the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence",
by federally licensed nuclear facilities. Thus the Act proscribes federal
strict liability upon the nuclear industry for injuries caused by an extraordinary incident.
If, however, the nuclear accident is less than an extraordinary
nuclear occurrence, an accident often referred to as "subthreshold," a
question arises whether preemption will prevent imposition of state
strict liability law. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. ," the District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that the PriceAnderson Act does not preempt state law in a "subthreshold" nuclear
accident.
Silkwood was the first major personal injury case to assess a
manufacturer's liability for the escape of radioactive material." The
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
2. For specific defenses waived see note 29 infra.
3. The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" signifies any event which
results in (1) a substantial release of radioactive material or substantial radioactive
levels offsite and (2) has resulted in substantial damage to persons or property offsite.
See 42 U.S.C. § 20140) (1976). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined
that the first criteria is satisfied: if a specific dosage of radiation is absorbed by specific
organs; or if a specific amount of radiation, released from a production or utilization
facility, has contaminated at least 100 square meters of property; or if a specific
amount of radiation, released in the course of transportation, has contaminated any
offsite property. 10 C.F.R § 140.84(a)-(b) (1980). The second criteria is satisfied if
there is:
(1) [T]he death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five or more
people .

.

. showing ...

physical injury from exposure to .

.

. [radiation] ...

; or

(2) The Commission finds that $2,500,000 or more of damage offsite has been or
will probably be sustained by any one person or $5,000,000... in the aggregate...
or (3) The Commission finds that $5000 or more damage offsite has been or will
probably be sustained by each of 50 or more persons, provided that one million or
more . . . in the aggregrate has been or will probably be sustained. 10 C.F.R. §
140.85(a) (1)-(3) (1980).
4. 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
5. Id. at 573-74.
6. Letter from District Judge Frank G. Theis to Bureau of National Affairs,
January 14, 1980 (on file at the University of Dayton Law Review Office).
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district court held that traditional state7 tort concepts mandate imposition of strict liability upon a defendant for any injury which results
from the escape of radiation from its facility.'
In an exhaustive opinion on the defendant's post-trial motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or, alternatively a new
trial, 9 the district court addressed three main contentions raised by the
defendant, Kerr-McGee.' The defendant first contended that federal
preemption prohibited the imposition of strict liability unless federal
law, as provided for in the Price-Anderson Act, required it.' Strict
liability, therefore, could not be imposed for a subthreshold nuclear
accident. Second, the defendant contended that liability could not attach if exposure levels were within the permissible levels set by the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).'" Third, the defendant contended that even assuming
initial liability, its substantial compliance with federal regulations barred an award of punitive damages. 3
This note analyzes the preemption issue in view of the statutes, the
applicable case law and the legislative history of the Price-Anderson
Act. The effect of compliance on the issues of liability and punitive
damage will be analyzed together in view of the federal regulations and
the applicable case law. This analysis will lead to the conclusion that
state law is not preempted by the Price-Anderson Act and compliance
with federal regulations is only evidence of reasonable care, and is,
therefore, not a shelter from liability.
FACTS AND HOLDING

Karen Silkwood was employed by the defendant, Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corporation, at the Corporation's fuel rod fabrication plant
in Oklahoma, from August 3, 1972 to November 13, 1974.'" On three
7. Except in matters governed by the Constitution or by Act of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state, as established by its legislature or
its highest court. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). But see note 76
infra.
8.
9.

485 F. Supp. at 571.
A verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted when the verdict is against

the clear weight of the evidence or whenever in the exercise of sound discretion the trial
judge decides that it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
10. 485 F. Supp. at 572. The defendant alleged 22 separate grounds to support the

motions; however, the trial court opinion mainly addressed the three main propositions. This note will analyze these three main propositions. 11.
12.
13.
14.

485 F. Supp. at 572.
Id. See note 42 infra.
Id.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 460 F. Supp. 399, 401-02 (W.D. Okla. 1978)

(this was a separate action brought by the Silkwood Estate alleging that the KerrMcGee Corporation prevented Ms. Silkwood from organizing a labor union).
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occasions in 1974, she was exposed to radiation from plutonium. On
November 5 and 6, the exposure took place at the facility and on
November 7, at her apartment." Investigations uncovered that the
-levels of radiation in her apartment on November 7 constituted approximately one fourth of that permitted by federal regulations for a
radiation worker during her lifetime, and exceeded by two and one
half times the exposure permitted to any other member of the public.' 6
The radiation levels, however, were not high enough to be considered
an extraordinary nuclear occurrence under the Price-Anderson Act."
On November 13, 1974, six days after Ms. Silkwood was exposed to
the radiation, she died in an automobile accident that was unrelated to
her irradiation. II
A personal injury action was filed in the district court by Bill M.
Silkwood, administrator of Ms. Silkwood's estate, against Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corporation. 9 The complaint alleged that the defendant was
liable, under either strict liability or negligence principles, for the decedent's injuries caused by her exposure to plutonium -that had escaped
'from the defendant's facility." ° The complaint alleged that Ms.
Silkwood's injuries included radioactive contamination of her internal
organs, tissues and genes. It further charged that as a result of her ex15. 485 F. Supp. at 595 app. (jury instruction number two).
16. Id. at 583. See generally Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for
Remote Causes: The Low Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REv. 531, 542 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Keyes & Howarth]. In the determination of whether the risk of
contamination from specific levels of radiation is acceptable, Congress has identified
two classes of individuals. The first class includes certain occupational workers who
work for remuneration at a radioactive source. The second class includes members of
the general public who work or live near a generated source of radiation. The levels for
the public are set at one-tenth those set for radiation workers. It is argued that the rationale behind the distinction is that the occupational worker somehow assumes the
risk attached to receiving radiation doses that do not exceed the currently acceptable
standards. Id. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that is established by showing that the plaintiff was informed and appreciated the magnitude of risk he incurred.
The choice must be shown to be entirely voluntary and freely made. W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 79 at 523 (4th ed. 1971). It is questionable that a radiation facility
worker assumes the risk of contamination onsite. See Keyes & Howarth, supra note 16,
at 542. After consideration of the defense of assumption of risk, the district court ruled
that it was clear Ms. Silkwood did not assume the risk of contamination at her apartment. 485 F. Supp. at 583. Therefore, the court did not have to decide the question of
whether she assumed the risk of contamination at the facility. Id.
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Ms. Silkwood died in an auto accident when her car left the highway and
struck a concrete abutment. She was on her way to discuss her allegations of the unsafe
working conditions at the defendant's facility with a New York Times reporter and a
union representative. See Time, January 18, 1975, at 8-9.
19. 485 F. Supp. at 566.
20. It was stipulated that the plutonium in Ms. Silkwood's apartment came from
the defendant's plant where Ms. Silkwood worked. 485 F. Supp. at 595 app. (jury instruction number two).
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posure, she had experienced mental and emotional trauma, suffering,
and anguish.' Punitive damages were also requested. 22 The trial
culminated on May 18, 1979,23 with a general verdict for the plaintiff
of $10,505,000.00.2" The verdict was accepted by the court and judgment entered against the defendant. 25 Kerr-McGee then made alternative motions, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a
26
new trial, both of which were denied.
The district court held that state tort law principles were applicable
to an injury caused by a federally licensed nuclear facility. The injury
arose out of a nuclear incident 2 7 not within the purview of the PriceAnderson Act, that is, a subthreshold nuclear accident. 2" The court
held that because the Act establishes a waiver of defenses to state law
claims, 29 as opposed to a federal law of strict liability, Congress intended that all questions of liability for radiation injuries be submitted
for a determination under state tort law." The court concluded that
the Price-Anderson Act was not intended to supplant or preempt state
tort concepts of strict liability for injuries caused. by a subthreshold
nuclear incident." This conclusion was based upon the absence of a '
21. 485 F. Supp. at 595 app. (jury instruction number two). The damages were
correctly limited to those injuries which began on November 5, 1974, and ended with
her death on November 13, 1974. 485 F. Supp. at 602 app. (jury instruction number
eighteen). ,
22. 485 F. Supp. at 595-96 app. (jury instruction number two). The jury could
award punitive damages if they found the defendant's conduct to be willful or wanton.
See note 35 infra.
23. 485 F. Supp. at 570.
24. The jury awarded actual damages of $505,000.00 and punitive damages of
$10,000,000.00. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 573.
27. "The term 'nuclear incident' means any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence ... causing ... bodily injury ... or loss of or damage to
property . . . arising out of or resulting from the radioactive ... [material].. . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1976).
28. A subthreshold nuclear incident does not meet the requirements to be classified as an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
29. Specific defenses waived under the Price-Anderson Act include
Qs)any issue... as to conduct of the claimant or fault of persons indemnified, (ii)
any issue . . . as to charitable or governmental immunity and (iii) any issue...
based on any statute of limitations if suit instituted within three years from . . .
(when) ... the claimant first knew or reasonably could have known of his injury.
. . but in no event more than twenty years after the date of the nuclear incident.
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976).
30. The United States Supreme Court stated in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1978), that "a waiver of defenses
was thought to be the preferable approach since it entailed less interference with state
tort law than would the enactment of a federal statute proscribing strict liability."
31. 485 F. Supp. at 573.
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clear manifestation of congressional intent to preempt state law."
After concluding that state tort principles should be applied, the
court considered the weight to be given to compliance with the federal
regulations 3 regarding levels of permissible doses of radiation. 3" After
considering the weight that has been given to compliance with federal
regulations in the aircraft and drug industries, the court said that compliance with AEC and NRC regulations is only evidence of reasonable
conduct. Although the court stated that compliance is not a bar to the
imposition of liability, under either strict liability or negligence, such
compliance is strong evidence that punitive damages are not appropriate."
The court, applying state tort principles, determined that the
operation of the defendant's facility constituted an abnormally
dangerous activity. It adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts view
that one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
strict liability for damages that result from the activity even though he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.3" Therefore, the
defendants would be held strictly liable for any injuries that resulted
from the escape of plutonium from the facility" unless they could prove
either lack of causation, 3 8 or alternatively, that Ms. Silkwood intentionally carried the plutonium into her apartment. 39
32. Id.
33. Federal regulations set out limits of error, that is, the amount of material that
is allowed to be unaccounted for, as well as permissible levels of radiation both onsite
and offsite. The regulatory scheme allows .5 grams of plutonium to be unaccounted
for. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.101-20.106 (1980).

34. The defendant contended that compliance with federal standards bars any application of strict liability, and is conclusive evidence of reasonable care. Alternatively
it alleged that substantial compliance barred any award of punitive damages. 485 F.
Supp. at 577.
35. Oklahoma law requires a showing of malice and evil intent for the plaintiff to
recover punitive damages in a tort action. Malice and evil intent can be inferred if the
defendant commits willful and wanton acts in reckless disregard for another's rights.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. of Okla. v. Ozment, 434 P.2d 893 (Okla.
1967). Since substantial compliance is evidence of reasonable conduct, it would be conclusive evidence against the award of punitive damages which require willful and wanton acts in reckless disregard for another's rights on the part of the defendant.
36.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977).

37. 485 F. Supp. at 571.
38. To find the defendant liable, the plaintiff must prove that radiation was a
cause in fact of the injuries. This can be very difficult in cases of low level contamination or levels within the permissible doses set by the AEC and NRC. The plaintiff must
also show that the radiation was the proximate cause of his injuries. Proximate cause
involves a public policy decision as to whether, after a showing of factual causation,
society wishes to hold the defendant liable. Failure to prove either a cause in fact or
proximate cause will prevent the plaintiff from recovering. See generally Keyes &
Howarth, supra note 16, at 547.
39. 485 F. Supp. at 597 app. (jury instruction number seven). See 42 U.S.C. §
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An analysis of the court's decision must begin by addressing the
threshold question whether the Price-Anderson Act preempts the imposition of state strict liability law. To answer this question, it will be
necessary to examine the history of the Act.
ANALYSIS

A.

History of the Price-Anderson Act

The Price-Anderson Act is an amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.40 The Atomic Energy Act was enacted to introduce
private industry into the development field of atomic energy and to
end the federal government's absolute monopoly over the production
of nuclear power."' The Atomic Energy Act was designed to encourage
widespread private sector involvement in the development of nuclear
energy. It permits private investors to construct and operate nuclear
facilities under federal licensing and regulation by the NRC. ' Congress anticipated that the private sector would immediately step into
the production and sale of nuclear energy. 3 Private industry, fearful
of unlimited liability arising out of a nuclear accident, remained
uninterested. 4 4 This lack of interest was primarily because of the prohibitive cost and nonavailability of liability insurance.4 ' Accordingly,
Congress, to further encourage private sector investment, passed the
Price-Anderson Act 4 6 in 1957. This legislation provided for indemnification of nuclear facilities licensed by the federal government for
losses sustained in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 7
2210(n)(1) (1976). Even in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the PriceAnderson Act does not require a waiver of a defense based upon the intentional conduct of the claimant. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2011-2281 (1976).
41. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 63
(1978). For a formal statement of the purpose of the 1954 Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2013
(1976).
42. The NRC is authorized to prescribe safety and security regulations. See 42
U.S.C. § 2061(b)(2c) (1976). Under the original 1954 Act, this function was handled by
the AEC. In 1974, the AEC was abolished and allof its functions were transferred to
the NRC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No.
93-438. 88 Stat. 1233 (Oct. 11, 1976)).
43. See Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MIcH. L. REv.
479, 490 (1973).
44. Id. See also 438 U.S. at 64.
45. Id.
46. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). The Act had the dual purpose
of protecting the public and encouraging the development of the atomic energy industry. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210() (1976).
47. The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability arising out of a nuclear accident to
560 million dollars ($500 million limit on federal indemnity plus $60 million which is
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In 1966, the Act was amended to provide for waivers of state and common law defenses by licensees in the event of litigation arising as a
result of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence." The amendment has
the effect of imposing strict liability on the nuclear industry for injuries caused by an extraordinary nuclear accident."
The issue presented in Silkwood was whether the Price-Anderson
Act preempted the field of strict liability in a "subthreshold" nuclear
accident. The district court's decision that the Act does not preempt
state strict liability law was based primarily on the lack of congressional intent to "occupy the field."' 0 This conclusion is strengthened
by an analysis of the doctrine of federal preemption.
B. FederalPreemption of the Price-Anderson Act
The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the supremacy clause of
the Constitution which provides that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land." According to
this doctrine, a state law cannot stand if it frustrates the objectives of
Congress." In determining whether a state law is preempted, a court
will examine the language of the federal statute and its legislative
history.
Preemption can be either express or implied.' 3 Express preemption
occurs when the language of a federal statute expressly voids state
power." In the event of a nuclear accident which meets the requirements of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" under the Act,
all state law defenses are expressly preempted." Preemption results
because such an accident would come within the specific provisions of
available from the nuclear facility's private insurance). 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1976). In
1975, Congress, in anticipation of damages accruing in excess of $560 million, added
"Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident and will take whatever action
is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a
disaster of such magnitude." 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L.
No. 94-197 § 6, 89 Stat. 1113 (1975)).
48. See note 29 supra.
49. See Murphy & Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and
the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 407
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Murphy & Pierre].
50. Congress is said to "occupy the field" when the federal regulation is so extensive as to preclude state regulation, even concurrently, in the same area. See Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
52. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
53. Note, May a State Say No to Nuclear Power? Pacific Legal Foundation Gives
a Disappointing Answer, 10 ENVT'L L. 189, 194-95 (1980).
54. See Meek, Nuclear Power and State Radiation Protection Measures: The Impotence of Preemption, 10 ENVT'L L. 1 (1979).
55. See Murphy & Pierre, supra note 49, at 407.
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the Congressional Act. Express preemption was not raised as an issue
in Silkwood because the Price-Anderson Act does not contain an explicit provision voiding the imposition of strict liability by state law in
a substhreshold nuclear accident. 56 The defendant's argument,
therefore, was based upon implied preemption.
Implied preemption occurs if the legislative history of a federal
statute clearly shows a Congressional intent to exclude state control."
In attempting to set forth a standard for determining the existence of
implied preemption, the United States Supreme Court in Rice v. Sante
Fe Elevator Corp.,5 stated: "[W]hen Congress legislated ... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied . . . we start with the
assumption that . . . the power of the state . . .[was] ...not . . .[to
be] ... superseded by the federal act . . . unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 9 In Silkwood, therefore, a presumption in favor of state law existed since the imposition of strict
liability is within an area of traditional state authority.60 The focus in
Silkwood was whether this presumption was rebutted by Congressional
intent to displace state imposition of strict liability for injuries caused
by the escape of radiation from a federally licensed and regulated
facility.
A determination that Congress has intended to preempt state law
can be reached in two ways. 6 ' The first manner in which implied
preemption will occur is when the congressional action is in a field in
which federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. 6 2
In evaluating whether the federal interest is so dominant as to
preclude state action, the purposes of the Price-Anderson Act must be
examined. The Act was intended to further two objectives. First, the
Act was to assure that funds would be available to satisfy liability
claims arising out of a catastrophic nuclear accident. 63 Second, the Act
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
57. See Murphy & Pierre, supra note 49, at 407.
58. 331 U.S. 218 (1947), cited in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978).
59. 331 U.S. at 230.
60. Prior to the enactment of the Price-Anderson Act, a plaintiff's only relevant
right was to utilize his existing common law rights and state law rights to vindicate any
harm visited upon him from whatever sources. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 89 n.33 (1978).
61. Sekuler & McCullough, Litigating Nuclear Waste Disposal Issues-Before the
NRC: A Fable of our Time, 15 TULSA L.J. 413 (1980).
62. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
63. See notes 43-47 supra.
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was intended to remove the impediment that discouraged the entry of
private industry into the nuclear energy field." While appraising the
1965 extension, the joint committee on atomic energy found a key consideration to be that victims of a nuclear accident might remain uncompensated as a result of the vicissitudes of state tort law. 65 At that
time, many states did not impose a rule of strict liability. Thus
recovery in these states would be predicated upon proving negligence
in the operation of the reactor." Because the possibility of recovery
would vary from state to state, Congress was urged to enact a federal
law of liability. Congress chose not to do so. Instead, in order to insure that strict liability would be imposed in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, Congress amended the Act and provided
for a waiver of state law defenses on the part of nuclear facilities.67
The dominant federal interest in amending the Act was to insure a
uniform scheme of strict liability in the event of an extraordinary
nuclear occurrence with only a minimufi -interference with state law.
Secondly, implied preemption will result if the federal scheme is so
pervasive to make the reasonable inference that Congress left no room
for supplemental state action." Under the Act, the scheme of imposing
strict liability is not so pervasive to make a reasonable inference that
Congress intended to preempt the application of state tort law in the
event of a "subthreshold" nuclear accident.
Clearly, the state tort law must apply since the Price-Anderson Act
does not create an independent cause of action." Under the Act, the
claim arises out of state law. The Act does not determine whether a
claimant will recover, but instead determines whether certain obstacles
to recovery will be removed. These defenses are only removed in the
event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.7" Congressional committee reports indicate that Congress intended that state law, including
strict liability, should be applied to cases like Silkwood in which the in-

64. See Comment, The IrradiatedPlaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside Price Anderson, 6 ENVT'L L. 859 (1976).
65. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Selected
Materials on Atomic Energy Legislation 31-40 (Subcomm. on Leg. print 1965).
66. See Note, The Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence "Threshold" and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 630 (1974).
67. 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(4) (1980). See also note 30 supra.
68. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1944).
69. Whether or not there is an extraordinary nuclear occurrence "the claimant
must proceed (in the absence of settlement) with a Tort Action . . .under the law applicable in the relevant jurisdiction." 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(4) (1980).
70. 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(4) (1980).
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jury arose out of a subthreshold nuclear accident. 7 Even the NRC
regulations state that in the absence of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the plaintiff must proceed with a tort action under the applicable state law."
It is evident, therefore, that the legislative history of the PriceAnderson Act and subsequent regulations promulgated by the NRC
does not reveal the clear and manifest intent of Congress that is required to preempt state authority in the imposition of strict liability in
the event of a subthreshold nuclear accident.
Thus an analysis of the doctrine of federal preemption together
with the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act, support the
district court's conclusion that the Act does not preclude the application of state tort principles in a nuclear accident.
C.

Application of State Law-Effect of
Compliance with FederalRegulations

Once it had concluded that the Price-Anderson Act did not
preempt application of state law, the Silkwood court had to determine
whether a strict liability or negligence standard was the law of
Oklahoma. In strict liability, the plaintiff would be relieved of the
burden of proving fault or breach of the standard of care,73 and would
only have to prove causation. 7 '
The Silkwood court adopted a strict liability theory holding that
the operation of the defendant's facility constituted an abnormally
dangerous activity.7" Thus the defendants would be liable for any injury which resulted from the escape of radiation from the facility
whether or not the level was within the NRC limits. In determining
that a nuclear facility is a dangerous activity, the court used a Ryland
v. Fletcher76 analysis. The court considered: whether the risk of harm
71. "It is desirable not to invoke the mechanisms and procedures of the new
system ... in situations which are not exceptional and which can well be taken care of
by the traditional system of tort law." Proposed amendments to the Price-Anderson
Act: Hearing on H.R. 15913 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966). (Statement of Ramey, Commissioner of the AEC). See also
S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3206-08.

72. 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(4) (1980).
73. See Keyes & Howarth, supra note 16, at 544.
74. Id.
75. 485 F. Supp. at 579 app. (jury instruction number seven).
76. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The rule of Rylands is that one who brings, on his land for
his own purpose, an activity that is likely to do mischief if it escapes, does so at his
own peril and is answerable for all damages which are a natural consequence of its
escape. On appeal, the holding in Rylands was limited by Lord Cairns to unnatural
uses of the land. 3 H.L. 330, 331 (1868). See also Foster & Keeton, Liability Without
Fault in Oklahoma, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1950). It is questionable, however, whether
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is great; whether the risk cannot be eliminated with the utmost care;
and whether the activity is not one of common usage." Clearly there is
a great risk of harm in operating a nuclear reactor which cannot be
eliminated with the utmost care. The activity, even in this nuclear age,
is probably not one of common usage. Therefore, the Silkwood
court ruled as a matter of law that the defendant's fuel rod fabrication
plant was an abnormally dangerous activity."'
In so ruling, the Silkwood court did not give adequate consideration to the possible ramifications of holding the nuclear industry strictly
liable for any injury which results from the escape of radiation from a
facility whether or not the level was within NRC limits. Under
Silkwood, any person who is exposed to radiation from a nuclear
facility, need only prove causation in order to recover his actual
damages for injuries sustained from the exposure. Liability is imposed
without regard to fault, lack of reasonable care or breach of duty."
Therefore, even if Congress intended that the regulations establish the
standard of reasonable care, this would not evidence an intention to
dictate the legal relationship of the parties in a situation where fault is
irrelevant. 0 Absolute liability presumes no violation of an applicable
standard of care. 8' Compliance with federal regulation, therefore, will
not be a defense.
When strict liability is imposed on a nuclear facility, the issue of
the amount of weight that should be given to compliance with federal
regulations can only be properly raised in the determination of whether
punitive damages should be awarded. 8" Any proof of reasonable care
Rylands is followed in Oklahoma. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma specifically rejected by name the Rylands v. Fletcher type of strict liability in Gulf Pipe Line Co. v.
Sims, 168 Okla. 209, 32 P.2d 902 (1934). Gulf Pipe has not been overruled. In Young
v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961), however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that the spraying of pesticides came within the Rylands v. Fletcher type of
strict liability without making reference to, or overruling Gulf Pipe. Dean Prosser
stated, in his treatise on torts, that Oklahoma was one of seven states that had not yet
accepted the Rylands approach to strict liability. See W. PROSSER, The Law of Torts §
78 at 516 (4th ed. 1971).
77. 485 F. Supp. at 597 app. (Jury instructions six and seven). See also McLane v.
Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1969).
78. 485 F. Supp. at 571.
79. See Keyes & Howarth, supra note 16, supra at 544.
80. McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, ,467 P.2d 635, 641
(1969) (the defendant was held strictly liable for injuries which resulted from an explosion of defendant's gas storage tank).
81. Id.
82. The issue of compliance would be an important consideration if this case were
proceeding upon a negligence theory in which the plaintiff's recovery would depend
upon proof that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care. See also Note, The
"Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under
the Price-Anderson Act, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 360 (1974).
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would negate the finding of willful, wanton or reckless conduct which
is mandatory in establishing punitive damages.8 3 Proof of reasonable
care would, therefore, prohibit the imposition of punitive damages.
Regulations are generally no more than a minimum standard of
care and do not preclude a finding that the actor did not exercise
reasonable care in failing to include additional precautions."4 An examination of the AEC and NRC regulations reveal that they are not intended to be conclusive. They require that the nuclear industry make
every reasonable effort to maintain the lowest radiation levels
(minimum permissible doses) possible with the technology available.8 5
This represents a changing standard commensurate with the level of
technology. The Silkwood court held that compliance is evidence of
reasonable care, 6 a conclusion supported by the weight given to compliance with regulatory schemes in other industries, such as the aircraft
industry and drug manufacturers.
In the aircraft industry, complete compliance with Federal Aviation Administration's safety regulations is evidence of reasonable care,
but is not conclusive.8 7 Similarly, compliance with federal laws and
regulations by a drug manufacturer is admissible as evidence of
reasonable care, but it is also not conclusive."8 In both industries, strict
liability may be imposed even though full compliance with governmental regulations has been demonstrated. 9
Thus the maintenance of the nuclear facility within a federal
regulatory scheme should be an important consideration, not in the
imposition of liability,9" but in determining whether an award of
punitive damages is appropriate. As evidence of reasonable care, compliance would seem to negate a finding of willful or wanton conduct,
and therefore, would preclude an award of punitive damages.'
Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury that substantial compliance with AEC and NRC regulations is "strong" evidence prohibiting the award of punitive damages. 9" The jury's verdict, however,
83.

See note 35 supra.

90.
91.
92.

See note 82 supra.
See note 35 supra, see also 485 F. Supp. at 586.
Id.

84. W. PROSSER, The Law of Torts, § 36 at 204 (4th ed. 1971).
85. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1(c) (1980).
86. 485 F. Supp. at 580.
87. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 1976).
88. See Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharmaceutical Co., 428 F. Supp. 496, 498
(D.D.C. 1977).
89. See Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.D. 1966),
aff'd 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969) (drug manufacturer); In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.
Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (aircraft manufacturer).
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would seem to indicate a finding of gross lack of compliance with the
regulatory scheme."'
CONCLUSION

Silkwood was the first major personal injury case to hold the
nuclear facility liable for injuries caused by an escape of radiation.9 '
The significance of this case lies in the final resolution of the question
of federal preemption with respect to the ability of courts to apply
state law principles of strict liability to the nuclear industry. If this case
is upheld, a plaintiff, to establish liability, will not have the additional
burden of proving negligence, and will only have to prove causation. 9 5
By establishing that nuclear energy production is an abnormally
dangerous activity, the Silkwood court has paved a road that other
courts, both federal and state, may choose to follow.
Kerr -McGee's proposition, that federal preemption prohibits the
imposition of strict liability except in accordance with federal law,
fails. In a personal injury action the imposition of liability is an area
where the state has traditionally exercised its power. Partial regulation
without clear and manifest intent to preempt is insufficient to supplant
state action. Scrutiny of the Price-Anderson Act reveals that Congress
intended that state law be applied to determine the liability of the
nuclear industry.
By establishing that compliance with federal regulations is evidence
of reasonable care, the Silkwood court attempted to give the nuclear
industry some protection against excessive jury awards. As the
$10,000,000 punitive damage award indicates, however, when conflicting evidence of compliance is presented 96 and the issue goes to the jury,
the nuclear industry is susceptible to large damage awards. Further
guidance, either judicially or legislatively, may be needed to limit the
discretion of the jury in this area in order to effectuate the original objectives that led to the enactment of the Price-Anderson Act.
John P. Napoli
93. The Silkwood Estate established evidence tending to show defendant's
reckless handling of plutonium. This evidence included "poor training, poor security,
workers who knew of a variety of ways to remove large amounts of plutonium from
the facility without detection, [and) workers indifferent to the hazards of plutonium..
." 485 F. Supp. at 591. If such evidence was found to be credible by the jury, it would
support a large punitive damage award. Id. at 593. Also evidence of non-compliance
with federal regulations was admitted. A Kerr-McGee witness testified that the inventory difference, see note 33 supra, on the amount unaccounted far exceeded that permitted by NRC regulations. 485 F. Supp. at 586.
94. See note 6 supra.
95. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
96. See note 93 supra.
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